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1.	DCI <i>21 April</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
2.	<i>DNFAC</i>	
3.		
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Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
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Coordination	Justify	


REMARKS

See DCI's note.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
<i>DNFAC</i>	Phone No.

**THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**




Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

18 April 1980

NOTE FOR: The Director
The Deputy Director

SI
APR 1980

Further to your request for comments
on the Ken Adelman article: I forward
 comments concerning
Adelman's suggestion that the Team B
conclusions "fared far better than those
of Team A."



Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

Attachment

		SEC. CL.	ORIGIN	CONTROL NO.	
			<i>NIO/SP</i>	<i>NFAC-2818-80</i>	
DATE OF DOC	DATE REC'D	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE	CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING	
TO FROM SUBJ.				ROUTING	DATE SENT
<i>Second Ticket</i>				<i>AS/NFAC</i>	<i>4/23</i>
<i>Orig ret a/note from</i>				<i>NIO/SP</i>	<i>1 MAR 1984</i>
<i>DCI (Very clear &</i>				<i>NIC Reg</i>	
<i>helpful - Thanks - Stan)</i>					
<i>Competitive Analysis File</i>					
<i>Retired 1 MAR 1984</i>					
COURIER NO.	ANSWERED	NO REPLY			
				1	

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

TS 802284
SP - 186/80
8 December 1980
Copy 2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Judgments on Minuteman Vulnerability, and "Tone" of the NIE 11-3/8 Series in the 1970s.

1. Per your request, our study on the subject is forwarded herewith. Attachment 1 addresses the "tone" of those NIEs regarding Soviet capabilities for intercontinental warfare. Attachment 2 assesses the "track record" concerning what we said about Minuteman vulnerability during the past decade. Our findings are summarized below.

25X1

2. Over the past decade the tone of NIEs on Soviet capabilities for intercontinental nuclear warfare have become increasingly somber, a trend which began in 1968. This shift has resulted largely from the accumulating evidence of steady and persistent Soviet efforts to improve all aspects of their strategic forces and supporting elements. Four phases can be identified over the past ten years in which there were some distinct changes in expressions of our perceptions and concern about the magnitude, pace, and objectives of Soviet strategic programs:

a. NIE 11-8-70: more sanguine in tone about the Soviet strategic threat, in comparison to later years. Characterized Soviet strategic programs as an effort to catch-up or "rectify the imbalance" with the US in strategic forces.

b. NIE 11-3/8-73: a clear expression of concern about the direction and pace of Soviet strategic programs. It noted that the Soviet build-up could not be explained solely in terms of trying to achieve parity with the US.

c. NIE 11-3/8-75: raised the question of whether the Soviets are, in fact, seeking clear strategic superiority over the US. It observed that Soviet strategic programs have moved well beyond the minimum requirement for deterrence.

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-2-

TS 802284
SP - 186/80

SUBJECT: Judgments on Minuteman Vulnerability, and "Tone" of the
NIE 11-3/8 Series in the 1970s

d. NIE 11-3/8-78: strengthened and reiterated previous substantive judgments about Soviet strategic objectives and programs. Its description of specific developments conveyed a tone of greater concern, noting that aspects of this build-up are coming to fruition faster than we had expected.

Each of these phases is examined in more detail in Attachment 1.

25X1

3. The Soviet ICBM threat to US Minuteman silos has been a key issue in NIEs since the 1960s. The table and analyses summarized in Attachment 2 show that--throughout the 1970s--a serious threat to Minuteman was forecast to occur in the first half of the 1980s. In the late 1970s, this threat was forecast to arrive somewhat sooner than predicted earlier in the 1970s. Specifically, from 1974 to 1977, the NIEs forecast that accuracy improvements, the key element in Soviet countersilo capabilities, would be made in follow-on systems to the ICBMs then being deployed. However, the expected improvements were incorporated into the existing systems. We had not expected this development and did not reflect it until the 1978 estimate. It had the effect of causing a serious threat to Minuteman (less than 200 survivors) to emerge in the early-1980s, rather than in the mid-1980s. Considerable uncertainties attend all forecasts of Soviet countersilo capabilities, however. Thus a serious threat could emerge several years before or after the dates indicated by using single-value assessments of Soviet ICBM characteristics. In spite of these uncertainties, the overall message conveyed in the NIEs of the 1970s (and in the 1980 estimate now in draft) was that a significant threat to Minuteman would occur in the first half of the 1980s.

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David S. Brandwein

Attachments

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-3-

TS-802284
SP - 186/80

SUBJECT: Judgments on Minuteman Vulnerability, and "Tone" of the
NIE 11-3/8 Series in the 1970s.

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NIO/SP: (8Dec80)

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

15 May 1980

SP 81/80

Copy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Hearing of Subcommittee on Oversight, HPSCI on NIE 11-3/8-79 (U)

1. Howard Stoertz accompanied by [] appeared before the Subcommittee on Oversight, HPSCI to testify on the quantitative analyses and the dissenting positions in the Summary, Volume I, NIE 11-3/8-79. Representative Aspin was the only member of the subcommittee at the hearing. A copy of Mr. Stoertz' opening statement is attached. (U)

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2. Questions by Mr. Aspin and staff members did not indicate that the committee was seriously concerned about the dissents in the NIE or reveal the committee's views about the utility of the quantitative analyses in the Summary. The issue may have been defused by the DIA witnesses who appeared before the Committee the previous day. Questions covered the following areas:

- Procedures by which the Summary Volume was produced.
- The basis for some of our judgments to which other agencies dissented.
- Prospects for resolving differences of views about the quantitative assessments in the 1980 NIE.
- Procedures for the presentation of alternative views and dissents including why certain positions were specifically attributed to the DCI.
- The absense of reference to the SAGA study.
- Questions on substantive judgments not directly related to the quantitative analyses or dissenting positions: hard target potential of the SS-17; rate of silo conversion; rationale for Soviet choice of a single or 10 RV system as their one new ICBM under SALT II; the new Soviet cruise missile submarine; relative costs of new MIRVed ICBMs and modification of existing MIRVed systems. (S)

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-2-

TS 802243b
SP 81/80

SUBJECT: Hearing of Subcommittee on Oversight, HPSCI on NIE 11-3/8-79

3. The atmosphere of the hearing was informal and friendly. We did not get the impression that Mr. Aspin or the staff members felt there were any major unresolved questions about the NIE. However, after the hearing Dick Anderson, of the Subcommittee staff, said that he thought Volume II of the NIE conveyed a more ominous impression of the threat than the Summary. (S)



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Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

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-3-

TS 802243b
SP 81/80

SUBJECT: Hearing of Subcommittee on Oversight, HPSCI on NIE 11-3/8-79

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NIO/SP (15May80)

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
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Room H-405, U.S. Capitol
 (202) 225-4121

7 MAY
 1980

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
 ON INTELLIGENCE
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515



May 6, 1980

NFAC-3339-80

Honorable Stansfield Turner
 Director, Central Intelligence
 Washington, DC 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

The Subcommittee on Oversight will continue its hearings on strategic intelligence on May 14 with a session concerning the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet strategic forces.


I would like to invite you or your designee to appear at 9:30 a.m. in Room H-405 of the Capitol to testify concerning the effectiveness of the recently released Summary of the NIE in quantifying the strategic balance and its appropriateness as a representation of the full Estimate. In addition, the Subcommittee will have questions on those other positions in the Estimate from which participants have dissented.

I invite you to bring experts on specific issues as appropriate.

The hearing will be held in executive session.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,


 EDWARD P. BOLAND
 Chairman